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Les Aspects 2conomiques du Droit de Prise. Par Jacques Dumas. Avec
une Preface de M. Lyon-Caen. Paris, Soci6t6 Anonyme du Recuell Sirey,
1926. Tome I, Avant la Guerre Mondiale. pp. xii, 237. Tome II, Depuls
la Guerre Mondiale. pp. 290. 126 fr.
With admirable industry and a great, but never superfluous, wealth of
documentation, Dr. Jacques Dumas has set himself to investigate from the
economic standpoint what are the real effects of prize capture. Dr. Dumas
has the high position of Advocate-General in the Court of Appeal at Paris,
which eminently qualifies him to be a good judge of evidence, and not to
interpret facts according to his liking. Therefore, although he is well
known as a convinced and almost militant pacifist, his pacifism is not
of the sentimental order. His conclusions are always based on reason,
whether we agree with the reasoning or not.
He finds that the capture of private property at sea is a game which
is not worth the candle. The complexity of modern business and insurance
makes it totally impossible to tell where the force of the blow will fall. If
capture is to be abolished, the institutions of contraband and blockade must,
he sees, be abolished too, except for a narrowly limited category of absolute
contraband, the export of which he thinks neutrals ought to be expected
to prevent. His first volume was in the press at the time of the outbreak
of the war of 1914; he publishes it now as it stood, and in his second volume
he reviews its conclusions in the light of the war. It is apparent that they
required, in themselves, little or no modification. No one expected, before
1914, that the theories of capture of enemy property, of occasional contra-
band and of continuous voyage would be used for the purpose of starving
out a belligerent population. as though it was a fortress; the thesis of his
first volume was simply that the capture of floating merchandise, as such,
was not in itself sufficient to bring about, or contribute powerfully to, the
surrender of an enemy, and that it was, moreover, costly in proportion to
its results; and for that he makes out a strong case.
At the same time, the reader may think Dr. Dumas is sometimes a little
inclined to eat his cake and have it. He draws an impressive picture of
the absolute dependence of Great Britain on the maintenance of sea com-
munications, demonstrating that prize capture is a most formidable weapon
(Vol. I, p. 126)-and when the adversary objects, "Why abandon such a
weapon," his reply is merely that although capture can work great havoc,
it can never reduce an adversary to terms. That is a petitio principii: it
is not enough to say that it never has reduced an adversary to terms, when
it is so obvious that it might. In fact he calls it the Allies' "best weapon"
(Vol. II, p. 11). himself. A further example of this intellectual tendency of
the author is afforded by his method of dealing with the, effect of war in
driving a belligerent's commerce to seek shelter under a neutral flag. If
it suits the argument, neutral capital will always be adequate to receiving
the belligerent ships and goods, or will find some specious method of cover-
ing the transfer (Vol. I, p. 38) ; again, if it suits the opposite argument,
belligerents will be too clever to be circumvented (Vol. I, p. 111). If it
is wrong to permit the supply of arms to a belligerent it is not wrong to
permit the supply to a poor country like Servia (Vol. II, p. 19). Neutrals
are wrong to trade with Germany and even to supply it with food (Vol. II,
p. 177)-but nothing is said about the enormous trade which America did
in'the supply of arms to the Allies!
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As in 1806, neutrals were, in 1914, too remote and too weak to secure
the observance of the standard law of prize. It is certain that powerful
nations would never permit their commerce to be interrupted as the bellig-
erents successfully controlled neutral commerce in 191G. But we have the
possibility of other world wars to reckon with. To abolish the right of
capture in ordinary wars might be a useful reform; but it would still leave
it possible to urge that we are thus depriving the belligerents in a world
war of a decisive weapon. The true answer to this is, that it is a felonious
weapon-it depends for its efficacy on the contempt of the rights of neu-
trals. The Allied stranglehold on Germany and the German submarine
campaign against British trade would both have been entirely impossible
had the rights of neutrals been respected.
In dealing with the new situation created by the mutual attempts of the
Central Powers and the Entente Powers to starve each other out, the author
comes to the reluctant conclusion that a case may be made out for the prop-
osition that a decisive military effect may be obtained by such an interdic-
tion. He does not think that in fact any such result was obtained by either
side. The German submarine campaign left Britain, France and Italy im-
porting as much wheat from America in 1917 as they respectively did in
1914. Perhaps he forgets that Russia was no longer a source of supply
-and surely the British people were rationed severely, the gravity of which
situation the Prime Minister and others admitted. More figures than Dr.
Dumas supplies would be necessary to convince us. And it is clear that
the weakening of the stamina of the German people was in a large measure
responsible for the final collapse of their armies, although Dr. Dumas argues
that they got all they wanted by requisitions. So that the novel military
weapon of starvation by capture may be conceded at any rate some value;
but here we are at once in the domain of contraband and its modem ex-
tensions. And in this connection we cannot refrain from pointing out an
inconsistency on the part of our author. While condemning blockades and
contraband altogether, he nevertheless excuses from point to point all the
extensions of the theory of contraband perpetrated by the Entente Powers.
Apparently he excuses them as reprisals, or vaguely because of the original
sin of the Germans.
When the Declaration of London provides a long list of articles which can
never be declared contraband, Dr. Dumas observes that it was quite right
to declare them such "as soon as Germany began to obtain them under false
names or under false colours." But if Germany was entitled to get them,
what did it matter what means were employed? It was far more straight-
forward to repudiate the Declaration as unratified; to adopt Dr. Dumas'
startling reasoning would be to deprive all international engagements of
any sense or value. Dr. Dumas, quoting Lord Salisbury's pronouncement
that food can only be contraband when detained for the (armed) forces of
the enemy, thinks that the mere fact that the amount of food exports to
a neutral had increased, demonstrates not only that the food was meant
to go to an enemy country, but that it was meant for his armed forces
(Vol. II, p. 152). What is hardly what we expected from Dr. Dumas (but
it is characteristic of much that used to be spoken and v'ritten in Entente
circles) is the suggestion, made more than once, that the protests of neu-
trals against the sophistries of the "blockade" were often nothing but the
expression of the thoughts and the interests of Germany. It is a greatly
regrettable outcome of the war to have committed France to the abandon-
ment of her old strong attitude against excessive belligerent pretensions
at sea. Oh, for an hour of Hautefeuille!
The author blames the maintenance by England of the right of prize
capture for the German submarine campaign; but the wild extensions of
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the principles of contraband, which he seems to approve, would have brought
about that campaign in any event. The capture of German goods was a
very minor matter. He speaks of the ill-will created against the Allies by
the rise of forces in neutral countries, and he blames prize-capture for that;
but it was again the contraband policy that was responsible. Neutrals, in
his eyes, are little better than Allies of Germany, and even France's Allies
do not please him; England's "high political instinct" saves her from the
losses to which others succumb-she gets -all the fresh fish she wants
(Vol. II, p. 187).
Dr. Dumas shows very forcibly that the so-called "blockade" was not a
blockade, and he asks why cabinets should not have proclaimed a regular
blockade, since the process was clearly effective enough. The obvious answer
is that the Baltic ports were not, and could not be blockaded. He usefully
points out that the Allied captures gave the Germans a handle for making
increased requisitions in the occupied territories; though as he observes
that they would have gone the limit anyway, the remark has less force than
it otherwise'might.
The author brings out with great cogency the paramount interest which
Great Britain as an insular power has in conserving her sea communica-
tions, by upholding the sanctity of private property and the sacredness of
the neutral flag. He does not hesitate to tell her that she need not expect
to be forever supreme at sea.
In Volume II, the author throws Jean-Jacques overboard, with his doc-
trine that war is a relation of state to state, and should not affect non-
combatants, which is the sheet-anchor of Volume I. How can we say that
war should not affect non-combatants when it is proclaimed that "l'armeo
c'est la Nation!" German "eratisme" has brought us to this pass; and, says
Dr. Dumas, Germans should not complain of the consequences. Unfor-
tunately, the consequences fell largely upon neutrals. It is extraordinary
how opinions change under the stress of circumstances; Dr. Dumas who in
Volume I is strongly in favour of the strict limitation of the category of
conditional contraband, in Volume II (p. 21) appears to complain of the
general supply of innocent articles by neutrals to Germany!
Dr. Dumas is most interesting and his book most valuable, when he comes
to estimate the relative value of the factors which contributed to raise and
lower the cost of insurance and freights during the war. He points out
with his usual acuteness that pure speculation and uncertainty always
count for a good deal in such matters. And he rightly lays stress on the
enormous risk, in the late war, to an innocent ship, of the unlawful and
oppressive new practice of sending in a vessel for examination on the chance
of making out a case. Dr. Dumas talks about the impossibility of search-
ing "a fond de cele" a big steamship at sea. But he ought to know that a
small ship was never searched "a fond de cele" at sea. Every one of those
vessels so sent in, in defiance of the evidence of her papers, ought to have
had costs and damages, except in cases where successful proceedings were
taken against her. In a war where it was utterly uncertain what the
Allies would do next, insurance rates had to cover, not only the probabili-
ties, but the possibilities of the case. Insurance is no sufficient guarantee
against prize.
In conclusion, we must say that every ramification of the topic is dealt
with in detail; the questions of transfer to foreign flags, of insurance, of
incorporation, of blockade, of contraband, of reimbursement etc., are all
carefully studied from a historical as well as a modern point of view. The
work is a perfect storehouse of information, which must have cost much
diligent and unremitting -labor to collect and to present in so intelligible
and attractive a form. It will doubtless be an indispensable classic.
Tokio, Japan Tn. BATY.
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Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance. By Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Chi-
cago, Callaghan & Co., 1928. pp. xvii, 199. .3.50.
This is a series of most interesting essays on problems in the law of
corporate finance which have largely arisen out of the rapid development
of the American securities markets during the decade since the World War,
and on which the law has not yet become wholly crystallized. Most of them
have already been published in various law reviews. Their titles are: The
Historical Basis of the Law of Corporation Finance, The Present Position
of the Corporate Management, Non-Voting Stock and "Bankers' Control,"
Non-Par Stock and Control of Participation Rights, Non-Cumulative Pre-
ferred Stock and Control of Participation in Surplus, Participating Pre-
ferred Stock and Control of Contingent Dividends, Convertible Bonds, Stock
Purchase Warrants and Control of the Value of Option Rights, Subsidiary
Corporations and Control of Credit Resources, Publicity of Accounts, Ian-
agement Purchases of Stock and Control of Security Values, and Develop-
ment of the Law of Corporation Finance. They may be read, with both
interest and profit, by laymen as well as lawyers. They are bound to have
a considerable influence on the development of the fields of law which they
discuss; indeed, one of them has already played a substantial part in induc-
ing two Circuit Courts of Appeal to disregard the natural meaning of a
contract by preferred stockholders that their annual dividends shall not
accumulate, and to hold that because of the "relationship" to common stock
of a stock expressed to be "preferred" there arise rights to corporate earn-
ings which become fixed as the earnings accrue, and which, notwithstanding
the contract that they shall not accumulate, do accumulate. The vice of
thus disregarding the explicit language of stockholders' contracts is well
pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Judge Learned Hand in Barclay v.
Wabash Railway Company, 30 F. (2d) 260 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).1
The thesis running through the essays under review is the development
of rather inelastic "relationship" obligations between the various classes of
security holders, between corporate management and the corporation and
its security holders, and between corporations under common control, or
controlled one by the other. The author has that type of mind which readily
consigns to precise pigeon-holes all varieties of corporate securities how-
ever complex, and tends to reduce complicated problems to mathematical
formulae. He has great facility for the pat phrase packed with the idea
intended to be conveyed, such as "Earnings should be christened at birth"
"and bastard subsidiaries." His zeal for the "relationship" rules for which
he contends leads him to a disregard (which will be somewhat shocking to
the lawyer with the conventional point of view of the fundamental principles
of the law of corporations) of what has always heretofore been regarded
as a contract between stockholders, embraced in the certificate of incorpora-
tion, by-laws and stock certificates, and subject to control and to modifica-
tion in accordance with the governing provisions of the constitution and
statutes of the state under whose laws the corporation was created.
While it may be conceded that draftsmen of corporate documents some-
times incorporate provisions purporting to grant to the corporation itself,
or to the management, powers which so shock the conscience that they
should be held to be invalid, and although it may also be conceded that
courts of equity should be zealous to protect against, and find remedies for,
abuse of powers by corporate managements or by one class of security
holders as against another class, nevertheless it is at least questionable
whether there is not more loss than gain in the development of rules of law
disregarding the clear language of contracts made between competent
INoted in (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 820.
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adults, wholly without any element of coercion, or in the development of
rules affecting the obligations of management so rigid in their standards
as to make responsible men hesitate to assume the risk of adverse after-
the-fact claims by disgruntled-or blackmailing-stockholders. Undoubt-
edly legal principles are constantly following the development of higher
ethical standards, but should they not follow such developments? In other
fields of law there is, and always has been, a substantial gap between the
strict rules of law, or, indeed, the principles enforced by chancery, and the
commonly accepted principles of etiquette and ethics.
And it may even be questioned whether there is any ethical gain in the
establishment of a rule of law respecting any corporate security which, as
the author seems to concede in respect of his rule governing dividends on
non-cumulative preferred stocks, produces a security which its creators
had no idea of creating, and which neither the original recipients nor the
run of investors and business men who may have purchased or dealt with
it, ever contemplated. The suggestion that "corporations having non-cumu-
lative preferred stock and holders of such stock should consider their re-
spective rights and duties: a revaluation of non-cumulative stock will fre-
quently result," coupled with the suggestion that "imaginative counsel" may
find ways of defeating contract provisions regarded by the author as oner-
ous, itself raises a question of ethics.
Undoubtedly, there is a drift in current decisions in the direction urged
/by Mr. Berle. Sometimes, however, he goes a bit far in his statement of
the present state of the law: for example, his erroneous statement that
under a New York charter of a corporation having stock without par value,
which states the capital to include a specified amount per share of stock,
the corporation may not issue any shares of such stock except at a price
per share at least equal to the amount attributed as capital in respect of
such share; again, his over-statement of the effect of Hodgman v. Atlantic
Refining Co., 13 F. (2d) 781 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926) ; see Bodell v. General Gas
& Electric Corp., 140 Atl. 264 (Del. 1927). Probably, also, he goes too far in
the proposition that it is doubtful that a contract between two corporations
under common control will be permitted, and in his, from a practical stand-
point, disqualification of corporate officers and directors from market deal-
ings in the securities of their corporations.
But however much one may dissent from Mr. Berle's underlying philos-
ophy, these essays must be recognized as an excellent and stimulating bit of
advocacy. As a statement of the present state of the law they are of
doubtful accuracy. Query, as to the extent to which they are a prophecy,
New York, N. Y. ROBERT T. SwAwNm.
The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic. By Thomas Hobbes. Edited
With a Preface and Critical Notes by Ferdinand Tnnies to which are
subjoined selected extracts from unprinted manuscript of Thomas Hobbes.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1928. pp. xvii, 195. 8s 6d.
"When the Parliament sate that began in April, 1640, and was dissolved
in May following, and in which many pointes of the regall power, which
were necessary for the peace of the kingdome and safety of his Majestie's
person, were disputed and denied, Mr. Hobbes wrote a little treatise in
English, wherein he did sett forth and demonstrate, that the sayd power
and rights were inseparably annexed to the sovereignty, which sovereignty
they did not then deny to be in the King; but it seems understood not
or would not understand, that inseparability. Of this treatise, though not
printed, many gentlemen had copies, which occasioned much talk of the
author; and had not his Majestie dissolved the Parliament, it had brought
him in danger of his life."'
3M R. HOBBES CONSIDERED (1662) 4, quoted in WOODBRIDGE, PHILOSOPHY OF
HOBBES (1903) xv,
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In Hobbes' day one could not philosophize in an easy chair. Intellectual
differences were likely to produce sharp physical repercussions. When the
Long Parliament met in November and promptly committed Strafford and
Laud to the Tower, Hobbes who, though intellectually courageous, was
physically timid, was the first of the royalists to flee to Paris. It is this
"little treatise in English," which caused so much annoyance to parliamen-
tarians and so much fright to Hobbes, that we have before us. Curiously
enough this work was never printed in the unified form first given to it
by the author until Professor Tnnies prepared his edition from the collated
manuscript copies of the "little treatise" preserved in the British Museum.
It first came from the press in 139, but the greater part of this impres-
sion was lost in a warehouse fire so that the book has been unobtainable
for many years. The present printing, with only slight changes from that
of 1889, makes the work readily available.
In 1650, while Hobbes was still a refugee in Paris, the "little treatise"
was printed as two separate works, the first entitled "Human Nature; or
the Fundamental Elements of Human Policy," and the second, "De Corpore
Politico, or the Elements of Law, Moral and Politic." The bi-section of the
work did not at all correspond with the division of the original work into
two parts, and certainly operated to weaken the unity of the author's treat-
menf. In the following year was published the philosopher's great work,
The Leviathan upon which his fame rests.
The modern reader of this work at first marvels at the reputation that
Heobbes acquired as a thinker, and even more at the persistence of his in-
fluence down to our own times. He is disposed to agree with Hume, who
w~rote a century later:
"No English author in that age was more celebrated, both abroad and at
home than Hobbes; in our time he is much neglected. . . . Hobbes'
politics are fitted only to promote tyranny and his ethics to encourage li-
centiousness."
Yet in spite of his unsound thinking and his obvious rationalizing, the
reader finds himself devouring his pages with eager interest and enjoyment.
This is due to the freshness and vigor of Hobbes' style, the independence
of his thinking and his readiness to take into account facts as he observed
them, and perhaps also to the interest that always attaches to the smooth
working of a syllogism, however doubtful the premise, or worthless the con-
clusion. It was not till after forty that Hobbes had first made the acquaint-
ance of Euclid. He embraced with enthusiasm his method of reasoning, and
used it with telling effect to deduce some most astounding conclusions from
premises asserted dogmatically to be necessary principles of natural law,
as derived from the dictates of reason. Thus: "Everyman by nature hath
right to all things, that is to say, to do whatsoever he listeth, to poZsess, use
and enjoy all things he will and can." (p. 55) It follows, as a corollary,
that the natural state of man is war; and since the end of natural law is
peace, "one precept of the law of nature therefore is this, that every man
divest himself of the right he hath to all things by nature." (p. 58) He
divests himself of his natural right to do as he listeth by making a cove-
nant with others of the community by which all are agreed that their com-
mon will to use force, "the sword of justice," shall be exercised by one man,
or one group of men thereunto designated, which is the sovereign. Inas-
much as the "right" of each man in nature is unlimitcd, it necessarily fol-
lows that the "right" conferred on the sovereign, as a sort of third-party
beneficiary of this social contract, is unlimited; and the subject, having
relinquished all his right, has no right to resist the sovereign. Hence the
sovereign cannot be punished, and has absolute power and right to exercise
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the will of the commonwealth, to raise armies, to make war and peace, to
levy supplies, to make and unmake laws, thereby determining relative ques.
tions of right and wrong, to appoint ministers and other public servants,
to determine the religious beliefs of the subjects, and, indeed, to do, without
let or hindrance, all the things that the Stuarts at the time were essaying.
While Hobbes' philosophy of governmental absolutism was naturally in-
terpreted in terms of the contest then raging between the Parliament and
Charles I, especially in view of Hobbes' expressed opinion that absolute
monarchy was the best form of government, it is to be noted that it was the
sovereignty created by the social contract, wherever it might reside, whether
in democratic assembly, oligarchic council or monarch, which was made
absolute by Hobbes in this first "little treatise" as well as in the more
elaborate Leviathan; and the ultimate basis of all of his reasoning is found
in the common weal. When looked upon as absolute sovereignty that leads
to governmental despotism, Hobbes' political philosophy has a remarkably
modern appearance. Thus, those that assert that the government, so long
as it acts under its sovereign's charter, the Constitution, has unlimited
"right" to determine what its subjects shall eat and what they shall drink,
and what they shall not, are merely declaring Hobbes' governmental despo-
tism; while those that assert that the prohibition laws violate the "personal
liberty" of the citizen are merely denying Hobbes' thesis that the sovereign's
"right" over the subject is without limit. The "little treatise" is significant
still.
The two fragments treating of optics and motion, here printed for the
first time, and incongruously bound in this volume as appendices, are irrele-
vant and immaterial in so far as the lawyer reader is concerned.
Yale Law School WILIAAM R. VANCE.
The Origin, Structure, and Working of the League of Nations,. By C.
Howard-Ellis. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928. pp. 528. $7.00.
The author finds the roots of modern international relations in "Science-
organized and cumulative knowledge" which he characterizes as the "one
new thing under the sun.' Science, he thinks, has increased contacts,
created universal interdependence, and exaggerated the gap between human
beliefs and the material conditions of human existence. The narrowing of
this gap he considers the great problem of the twentieth century, and the
major function of the League of Nations.
Not least interesting is the author's brief r~sum4 of the causes of the
war and of the peace. The first he finds in the "whole structure of inter-
national society. . . All the governments concerned were in varying
degrees responsible." The second he finds in "the paradox of modern war"
that "in order to win you must reduce the belligerent nations to a condition
where they are unfit to make peace." (p. 51) In illustration, he cites the
deliberate war-time opinion of several Englishmen who would be popularly
ranked above rather than below the average on the point of toleration.
Each of these writers advocated the treatment of the enemy as a mad dog
as the first requirement of peace.
Thus, in the author's opinion, a complete change in the methods of inter-
national relations is needed, and this change cannot be expected directly
from any war. He hopes for it, however, as the result of the activity of
the League of Nations which almost miraculously survived the barterings
of Versailles, though from a historical point of view it can be seen "to have
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grown materially and inevitably out of the forces that shape civilization."
The author writes with enthusiasm but judgment. His survey of the
origin of the Covenant, the functions of the League organizations, and the
rSle of the chief associated entities-the International Labor Organization
and the World Court-is well documented and unprejudiced. He admits
that writing on social conditions is selective. History is not an exact
science. Facts are "man-made, and we make them not in order to admire
their beauty as things in themselves, but primarily so as to do what we
want with them." Thus, while sticking close to events and documents and
occasionally criticizing, the spirit of the crusader is not wanting. Espe-
cially in dealing with some of the anti-war schemes widely propagandized
in America as substitutes for the League, he almost loses patience; he
wishes it understood that he does not believe in panaceas, but in the care-
ful day-to-day handling of incidents so as gradually to create habits of
resort to peaceful procedures, to strengthen institutions, and imperceptibly
to modify national interests and policies.
A chapter on International Law discusses its weakness, due to the vague-
ness of its sources, the range of important international relations outside
its ken, the lack of adequate means of development, and the dogma of
sovereignty theoretically incompatible with the existence of international
law at all. (pp. 302-305) The League, in the opinion of the author, has
introduced changes in international law more profound than public opinion
and politicians have realized, particularly in the facilities it gives for devel-
oping international law in accord with the actual conditions of international
society and on a basis of world polity rather than state sovereignty. (p.
363) The result of this has been an emphasis upon the law of peace, a
tendency to abandon the conceptions of war and neutrality, and to substi-
tute a law of international procedure and international police.
The book is in the main expositive. The author avoids generalizations
and theory, and his exposition gives evidence of first-hand kmowledge. The
chapter on the technique of the League's activities, dealing with open and
secret diplomacy, the ratification of conventions, assembly and council pro-
cedure, the function of technical organizations and of the secretariat officials
is particularly deserving of attention.
The book is the most ambitious yet published on the League as a whole.
It is as yet incomplete. The author promises two additional volumes deal-
ing with the functioning and with the achievements of the League. Theso
will be looked for with interest, and the present volume will undoubtedly
serve the useful purpose which the author intended in university classes
and among intelligent readers.
University of Pittsburg QUINCY WRIGHT.
Cases on the Law of Bailmcnts and Carriers and of Scrice by Public Utili-
ties. By Edwin C. Goddard. Second Edition. Chicago, Callaghan & Co.,
1928. pp. x-vii, 1033. $4.50.
Cases on the Law of Carriers. By Frederick Green. Second Edition. St.
Paul, West Publishing Co., 1927. pp. m-v, 851. $5.50.
Obsolescence in a casebook may arise from three different sources. The
illustrative value of the cases themselves may be impaired by the accumula-
tion of more recent decisions; the development of new points of view, or
changes in the field in which the law operates, may render the editor's
classification of the subject matter unsound; and, finally, the utility of the




Casebooks that were originally designed for courses in the law of carriers
have felt the full pressure of this threefold source of obsolescence. Twenty
years ago, when the first editions of Professor Goddard's and Professor
Green's volumes were the last word in casebook editing, a course in the law
of carriers was deemed an important, if not an indispensable item in every
student's schedule. Since that time, however, the course has steadily lost
ground. The expansion of the public utility industry, together with a
growing disapproval of narrowly specialized courses, has promoted the study
of public service law in general, rather than of a particular application of
the law to the business of the common carrier.
As a result of these changes it has usually been thought necessary to dis-
card most of the material assembled in casebooks for the old course. In
that course problems of regulation were considered chiefly in their relation
to the business of the carrier. The purpose of the course was primarily
to prepare the student to deal with commercial transactions arising between
the carrier and the shipper. The emphasis is now in the other direction.
Questions of commercial law are deemed relevant in the study of the law
of public service only to the extent that they affect the major problem of
regulation.
A second edition of one of the early casebooks in this field must, there-
fore, be scrutinized with more than the perfunctory examination usually
accorded a new edition of a work which basically has been unaffected by the
passing of time. Here the task is not so much to revise as it is to remake.
It is not so much a question of incorporating supplementary material as
it is a question of elimination.
But neither Professor Goddard nor Professor Green has felt the need
for this kind of treatment in the edition he now puts forth. Inasmuch
as "the bailment relation . . . deserves more than the incidental and
fragmentary reference it receives in property law courses," and since the
common carrier is "the foremost in extent and importance" of all public
utilities, Professor Goddard feels justified in retaining the material of his
original work with slight alteration, while he attempts to cover the more
recent developments in the law of public service through a series of supple-,
mentary chapters. Professor Green adopts the same method of revision
because he desires "to exhibit the law of carriers as including more than the
law of public service." For, he argues in his preface, "to require a carrier
to perform his services adequately and impartially does not, of itself, alter
the services or displace the law that governs them."
It is unquestionably true that the law of bailments has a definite histori-
cal relation to the responsibilities of the common carrier. It is also obvious
that the regulation of an industry relates to but one phase of its activities.
But it does not follow that either proposition is to be adopted as a thesis
for a course in public service law in the present day law school. And the
question still remains, whether in pursuing the doctrines of his preface,
either editor can counteract the obsolescence that has rendered most of the
casebooks on carriers unserviceable. The disintegration of the old course
is a fact that the mere revision of a casebook cannot obviate. For no
other reason than because the problems of regulation grow wider in scope
and recur more frequently, it has been necessary to dissociate them from
the questions of commercial law that constituted the bulk of the course in
carriers.
The extension of the doctrine of "public interest" to new types of indus-
try is rapidly eliminating the traditional lines of demarcation which were
once thought to separate the private from the public enterprise. Just as
Beale and Wyman at Harvard realized as early as 1902, that the law of
carriers was not the law of public service, so must every student of public
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law today recognize the futility of confining principles of regulation to
any arbitrary classification. Every type of industry is now subject, in vary-
ing degrees, to regulation in the interest of the public. If this be true, it
is clear that the present course in public service law is itself too rigid and
must, if the curriculum reflect reality, become part of a larger study em-
bracing a comparative consideration of the regulation of industrial enter-
prise in all forms. It is probable that the obsolescence which eliminated
the early- casebooks on carriers may overtake in even a shorter space of
time those more recent volumes which deal frankly with problems of regu-
lation in the field of public service.
If, therefore, these editors seek to revive the course in carriers, the signs
of the times are against them. If they seek to render their boolk
serviceable, even temporarily, in the new courses, it would secin that the
method of revision has not been sufficiently thoroughgoing. Doubtless each
volume contains much of special interest, and, after all, it is perhaps true,
that one should not look too deeply into the structure of a casebook. At
best it is a tentative guide to study, subject continually to variations to
meet the purposes, aims, and sometimes the whims, of the individual
instructor. This is nowhere more true than with respect to those books
which from time to time attempt to embrace the ever shifting law of public
interest.
Yale Law School RICHARD JOYCE S.ITH.
Litigation of Husband and Wife. By Charles M. Jacobs. Philadelphia,
Dorrance & Co., 1928. pp. 565. $7.50.
In a personal interview with the author, the reviewer was advised that
the object of the present volume was the collection of all the "legal" ma-
terial revolving about the subject of husband and wife. It is exactly this-
and perhaps regretfully nothing more-that the book accomplishes. The
social importance of Domestic Relations would seem to necessitate the col-
lation of materials other than strictly "legal," if that term is to be re-
stricted, and unfortunately so, to case law. Its importance is cearly indi-
cated by the increasing number of pertinent publications: for example, the
Russell Sage Foundation volumes on marriage, and recent casebooks by
Professor Madden and Professor McCurdy. The latter was ably reviewed by
Goeffrey May in (1928) 37 Yale Law Journal 1173.
The volume is indicative of a tremendous amount of hard and painstaking
labor in collecting and allocating so many decisions on the instant prob-
lem. The subject, susceptible to countless ramifications, is handled by the
author in cyclopedic manner. This "Corpus Juris" form of writing has
been attacked again and again; but apparently the objections have not
yet wholly prevailed. Since the subject is so difficult of standardization,
the author merits some praise because his book does present to the reader
a more or less carefully planned review of the subject. A chief criticism
which must be advanced is that the book contains no index, and only the
sketchiest table of contents referring to the chapter headings. This is un-
pardonable, and greatly impairs its sole function as a source book. The
author has made no attempt to reconcile, set off or compare decisions,
one with another, or even venture to contribute his own thoughts in any
fashion whatsoever with the view of analyzing the various decisions.
. It is a good piece of work only from the point of view of a complete as-
semblage of cases. It lacks, however, any individualistic touch or personal
contribution of analysis and constructive criticism.
Springfield, Massachusetts JOHN L ROB1NSON.
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Practice and Procedure in the Supreme Court of the United States. By
Reynolds Robertson. New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1929. pp. xlii, 418.
The first edition of this book appeared in 1928 and was reviewed in
(1928) 38 Yale Law Journal 134. While that edition was in process of
being printed, the Act of January 31, 1928 [45 STAT. 54], abolishing writs
of error to federal courts, was enacted, and its probable effect was discussed
in an appendix. Considerable doubt as to the meaning of Section 2 of that
Act arose soon after its approval, and, in order to clarify it, Congress
passed the Act of April 26, 1928 [45 STAT. 466]. The enactment of this
important legislation rendered desirable an immediate revision of this
manual. In the second edition the author has fully covered the subject of
appeals under the new statutes. Complete forms for use on appeal are also
included. Except for the chapters dealing with appeals and procedure in
original actions, the general outline of the earlier volume is followed. This
is now an authoritative handbook on procedure and forms in the Supreme
Court of the United States.
Birmingham, Alabama DOUGLAS ArANT.
REVIEWERS IN THIS IsSU
Thomas Baty has for some years been advisor to the Japanese Foreign
Office. Among his recent articles is The Obligations of Extinct States
(1926) 35 YALu L. J. 434.
Robert T. "Swaine is one of the outstanding corporation lawyers in the
United States. He is a member of Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaino &
Wood, New York City.
Williams Reynolds Vance is a Professor at the Yale Law School.
Quincy Wright is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chi-
cago. He is the author of several important works on International Law.
Richard Joyce Smith is an Instructor at the Yale Law School.
John I. RoliEison is a member of the Massachusetts Bar, and was a former
editor of the Yale Law Journal 1924-1926.
Douglas Arant was Editor-in-Chief of the Yale Law Journal 1922-1923, and
is now a member of the Alabama Bar.
1010
